SAFE Perimeter FAQs

We specify, install, and commission walk-through weapons detection screening for venues, schools, corporate campuses, healthcare, and government facilities — including lane design, throughput planning, staffing model, and secondary screening procedure.

The decision that governs everything else is throughput against sensitivity. Screening tuned to catch everything stops everyone, and a queue outside the doors is its own security problem. Screening tuned for speed misses things. Getting that balance right depends on your actual entry volume, peak arrival pattern, and what you are genuinely trying to intercept.

Lane count, placement, and the secondary screening path usually matter more to real-world performance than the specification of the units themselves.

Yes, and that is usually the better outcome. Most sites already have a video management system and an access control platform with years of configuration behind them. Replacing working infrastructure is expensive and rarely necessary; connecting it is what produces the picture nobody currently has.

Integration work typically covers video management systems, access control and credentialing platforms, intrusion and alarm panels, mass notification, and the security operations centre workflow that ties them together.

The value is in the correlation. A badge read, a camera view, and a wireless device appearing in a restricted area are three separate records in three separate systems. Together they are an incident — and no one system can see it alone.

Because screening, video, and access control all address people and objects crossing a physical boundary, and the fastest-growing threat categories do not cross one. A drone flies over it. A transmitting device is carried through in a pocket that no magnetometer will alarm on.

This produces a familiar gap: a site with excellent screening lanes, full camera coverage, and modern credentialing that cannot answer a basic question about the aircraft that just crossed the roofline, or the device transmitting from a suite it should not be in.

Most integrators have no capability in that layer at all. Adding it is what turns a well-built physical program into a complete one — which is why we lead with it, and why we also install the rest.

AirShield is a broad-spectrum wireless intrusion detection sensor built on software-defined radio. It continuously monitors 300 MHz to 6 GHz to discover, classify, and locate every emitting device in a facility — across Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth and BLE, LPWAN, GPS, and drone control links — without requiring any of those devices to be on your network.

A single AirShield sensor covers roughly 25,000 square feet. Sensors are PoE-powered, mount permanently, and connect to a cloud portal with no on-premise server required. LTE backhaul is available where running the sensor through your production network is undesirable.

The output is a live inventory of your wireless environment: what is transmitting, what protocol it speaks, what vendor made it, where it sits, and whether its behavior has changed.

A software-defined radio is a receiver whose tuning is handled in software rather than fixed in hardware. One physical sensor can therefore listen across many different kinds of signal — Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular, GPS, drone control links — instead of needing a separate purpose-built box for each.

The everyday comparison is a car radio that only receives FM versus a device that can be told, in software, to receive anything. The first is finished the day it ships. The second is defined by its instructions.

Two practical consequences for a buyer:

• Coverage. One AirShield sensor covers 300 MHz to 6 GHz — essentially the whole commercial spectrum — instead of covering Wi-Fi and calling that wireless security.
• Longevity. When a new protocol or a new threat device appears, support usually arrives as a software update rather than a hardware replacement. A fixed-function radio would need to be ripped out and re-bought.

That second point is what makes the difference over a five-year horizon. The wireless threat landscape moves faster than procurement cycles, and equipment that can only be updated by replacement falls behind.

Anything that transmits but never connects. In practice that means covert cameras and audio devices, cellular hotspots bridging around network controls, rogue and evil-twin access points, unauthorized cellular base stations, embedded radios inside newly delivered equipment, drone control links, and GPS interference.

The unifying property is that none of these produce a log entry in a system you already own. They are invisible to network-layer tooling not because the tooling is weak, but because there is nothing on the network to see.

With the large majority of IoT devices now connecting wirelessly, the gap between "devices on our network" and "devices in our building" keeps widening — and only one of those two is instrumented at most organizations.

Covert cameras and audio devices are found by their transmissions, not by looking for them. Any device that streams or uploads must emit — over Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, or cellular — and the sensor classifies that emission by protocol, vendor, and behavioral pattern, then localizes it so a security team can physically recover the device.

This is materially more reliable than the two conventional approaches. Physical searches miss devices concealed in fixtures, vents, and furniture. Handheld RF detectors give a proximity reading with no classification, no history, and no way to distinguish a covert camera from a guest's phone.

Continuous monitoring also catches the case a periodic sweep cannot: a device installed the day after your last sweep, or one that only transmits during a specific meeting.

Yes. Multi-tool devices like the Flipper Zero, Bluetooth-based card skimmers, and camera-equipped smart glasses all emit, and emission is what AirShield classifies. Each is identified by protocol behavior and device signature rather than by appearance, which matters because none of them look like an attack tool.

These have become the practical threat set in public-facing environments:

• Multi-tool RF devices — used against access control, RFID badging, and sub-GHz building systems
• Bluetooth skimmers — placed on payment terminals and fuel pumps, transmitting captured card data
• Smart glasses and wearable cameras — recording in areas where phones would be challenged but eyewear is not
• Spoofed captive portals — harvesting credentials from patrons who believe they are on venue Wi-Fi

The common thread is that traditional security controls have no way to see any of them. A guard cannot spot a skimmer, a camera cannot see a Bluetooth transmission, and a firewall never sees traffic that does not touch the network.

A rogue access point is an unauthorized wireless access point operating inside your environment. An evil twin is a rogue AP deliberately impersonating your legitimate network so that people and devices connect to it and route their traffic through an attacker. Both are identified by comparing observed RF characteristics against your authorized device inventory.

Impersonation is the harder problem: the SSID matches, so the endpoint sees nothing wrong. Detection has to happen at the radio layer — comparing signal characteristics, physical location, and behavior against the known-good baseline for your own infrastructure.

This is a recurring finding in high-traffic venues where third-party wireless installations, vendor kiosks, and tenant equipment create a large and poorly-inventoried footprint.

Yes. The sensors monitor cellular and CBRS spectrum and identify unclassified or unexpected cell towers operating in your environment — the signature of a rogue base station used to intercept mobile traffic through a man-in-the-middle attack.

Cellular is the blind spot most enterprises have never instrumented. Every employee, contractor, and visitor carries a device that can be induced onto a hostile base station, and none of that traffic touches your network or your controls.

Spectrum graphs show band occupancy and density, which lets teams identify unexpected cellular devices and enforce no-wireless policy in restricted areas.

Shadow IoT is the population of connected devices operating inside an organization without IT's knowledge or approval — smart TVs, building sensors, wireless printers, cameras, environmental controls, and vendor-installed equipment. These devices introduce operating systems, protocols, and frequencies the security team has never inventoried.

Two things make it dangerous. First, these devices are rarely patched and often ship with default credentials. Second, and less obviously, embedded radios arrive inside equipment nobody thought of as a network device — LOCH has found Wi-Fi, cellular, and Bluetooth modules inside newly delivered equipment during deployment, and a transmitting camera operating inside a customer clean room.

AirShield is the full-spectrum sensor: cellular, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth across roughly 25,000 square feet, with broad SDR coverage and a rugged permanent-mount enclosure. AirShield-Mini is a compact plug-in unit covering Wi-Fi and Bluetooth only across roughly 1,500 square feet, with no cellular or SDR coverage.

The selection rule is straightforward: if the threat model includes cellular exfiltration, rogue base stations, or drone control links, you need full AirShield. Mini is for extending Wi-Fi and Bluetooth visibility into microzones — tenant retail units, kiosks, individual suites — where full-spectrum coverage is already established nearby.

Yes. The sensors monitor GPS signal integrity and flag interference and anomalous behavior in the GNSS bands, which is how both jamming and spoofing present in the RF environment.

This matters wherever timing or position feeds an operational system: logistics and yard operations, financial and telecom infrastructure that depends on GPS for time synchronization, port and terminal operations, and any facility where autonomous or semi-autonomous vehicles navigate.

It does both. Beyond detection, the platform enforces policy against identified threats — terminating unauthorized wireless connections, isolating devices to prevent lateral movement, validating that access control lists are blocking on network switches, and testing port suppression to disable devices on the Ethernet network. Enforcement can be triggered manually or automatically on a policy violation.

This is the difference between a wireless intrusion detection system (WIDS) and a wireless intrusion prevention system (WIPS). Our deployments operate as both, which is why they belong in a response workflow rather than only in a monitoring dashboard.

The important scoping question is what you enforce against. Action taken against an identified threat to your own environment, as part of reasonable network management, sits on very different footing than blanket interference with communications you do not control. The FCC has enforced against the latter under Section 333 of the Communications Act, and in those matters the Commission specifically noted the absence of any identified security threat that would have justified the action. Threat-triggered enforcement as part of reasonable network management is a different posture than blanket blocking. Policy configuration is therefore part of deployment, not an afterthought.

Often, yes — because preparation emits. Analyzing the flow of devices and people surfaces unusual behavior before it escalates: an unauthorized device appearing repeatedly at the same hour, a drone controller powering up miles outside the perimeter, a device probing wireless infrastructure, or an abnormal movement pattern in a restricted zone.

Counter-UAS is the clearest illustration. Detection triggers on the control link during power-up and pre-flight, so an aircraft is frequently visible before it leaves the ground. That is a window for intervention rather than a record of an incident.

The same holds on the wireless side. Reconnaissance precedes exploitation, and reconnaissance is visible in the RF environment to anyone instrumented to see it.

It means nobody has to be watching a screen for the system to do its job. The sensors listen continuously, NetShield AI decides what matters, and a person is contacted only when something needs a person. On a quiet night, no one is bothered.

The plain version of the problem: a site covering a few hundred thousand square feet produces tens of thousands of wireless events a day. Nearly all of it is staff phones, guest devices, printers, and building sensors doing exactly what they should. A human being cannot read that, and a system that alerts on all of it gets muted within a week.

So the software learns what normal looks like at your site — which devices belong, where they usually are, what hours they keep — and raises only the departures from it. A device that has never been here before, sitting outside the executive floor at 2 a.m. A drone controller powering up across the road. A camera transmitting from a room that should have no camera in it.

What your team gets is a phone alert with the specific thing, the specific place, and the recommended action — not a dashboard to interpret.

NetShield AI is the agentic analytics layer that sits on top of the sensor network. It ingests data from AirShield, SkyShield, and connected security tooling, correlates events across the RF and aerial layers, and drives automated response rather than leaving correlation to an analyst.

The problem it solves is volume. A broad-spectrum sensor covering 300 MHz to 6 GHz across a large site produces far more events than a security team can triage manually, and the meaningful signal is usually a pattern across events rather than any single one — a device that appears at the same hour each week, a drone control link that precedes a wireless probe, a cellular anomaly correlated with a physical access event.

NetShield AI raises what matters, suppresses what does not, and executes the response policy your team has defined.

Start with whichever layer you can fund without a capital project, because a plan nobody can pay for protects nobody. Software running on cameras a district already owns is usually the cheapest entry point; wireless monitoring in one high-value area is next; walk-through screening is the largest commitment because of hardware, lanes and daily staffing.

Staffing is the part districts consistently underestimate. We size it before you commit rather than after. Full detail on the schools page.

That depends on lane count and placement, not on the equipment. We plan against your real arrival volume and peak pattern before anything is ordered.

Under-lane a building and the queue outside becomes its own safety problem, which is why throughput is part of the design rather than something discovered in week one.

No. The sensors observe that a device is transmitting, what type it is and roughly where it sits. There are no messages, no browsing history, no names, and no software installed on any student device.

Collection is anonymized. We recommend districts adopt a written board policy covering collection, access and retention before the first sensor is installed.

No, and neither can anyone else selling to a school district. Interfering with an aircraft in flight is restricted to a limited set of federal agencies, and jamming or shooting at a drone is a federal offense.

What a district can lawfully do is detect the aircraft, identify the model, track its path and locate the operator so a school resource officer or law enforcement has something to act on.

No. Detection software runs on cameras a district already owns, provided image quality holds at the distances involved, and existing access control is integrated rather than swapped out.

Where equipment genuinely cannot carry the load, we say so early rather than after a purchase order.

Hidden cameras concealed in rooms, fixtures, vehicles and gifts. Listening devices on or off the network. Cell interceptors positioned to capture calls and device identity. GPS trackers on vehicles, luggage and personal effects. Rogue and evil-twin networks. Camera-equipped wearables. And drones over property lines, helipads and arrivals.

The common thread is that all of it emits, and none of it is visible to a detail controlling doors, routes and rooms. More on the executive protection page.

A sweep is a moment in time. It is scheduled, expensive, dependent on the specialist in the room, often limited to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, and it leaves little forensic record. The room is clean when they leave and can be re-compromised minutes later.

Continuous monitoring is a posture rather than a visit: passive across 300 MHz to 6 GHz, surfacing threats in minutes with the device located for retrieval, and producing a time-stamped log that can be replayed after the fact.

Yes. A discreet enclosure covers a residence, office, aircraft or vessel, and an executive backpack carries the same capability through hotels, airports and unfamiliar rooms.

Nothing is on show and nothing needs explaining to a host or a guest. Because the sensors are entirely passive, they give away no signature of their own.

Yes. Camera-equipped eyewear and body-worn recorders emit like any other device and are identified by protocol behavior and device signature rather than by appearance.

That matters because appearance is exactly what they are designed to defeat. In a boardroom or a private dinner, nobody asks a guest to remove their glasses.

Drones over fans, players and press areas for observation or livestream piracy. Rogue access points and spoofed captive portals harvesting credentials. Bluetooth skimmers at points of sale. Covert cameras in locker rooms and executive suites. And illegal jammers deployed against alarms, radios or wireless payment during an incident.

None of it produces a log entry in a system a venue already owns. Detail on the stadiums and events page.

Yes. Mobile kits deploy from a vehicle or hardcase with no installation, which suits event-day surge, temporary venues and training camps.

For fixed venues hosting periodic events, a hybrid is usually better economics: permanent sensors over the core footprint, with mobile kits extending coverage to parking, overflow and perimeter approaches on event days. Managed coverage is also available through Drone Detection as a Service.

Either your team or ours. Where a venue wants trained personnel on post, we place licensed officers through our guard services partnership who are briefed on the detection stack they are working alongside.

An officer who understands what an RF or airspace alert represents responds correctly the first time, rather than escalating everything or ignoring what looks unfamiliar.

A refinery, hospital, data center or treatment plant is fenced, badged and patrolled. Its wireless perimeter and its control network usually are not. Contractor hotspots, wireless field instruments, legacy connected devices and internet-facing controllers are all entry points, and most operators have no continuous way to see them.

Coverage across sectors is set out on the critical infrastructure page.

Yes, and it is the reason discovery here has to be listen-only. Active scanning is unsafe for fragile control systems and clinical equipment that cannot tolerate being probed.

Our sensors receive only. They transmit nothing, so they cannot interfere with SCADA timing, medical telemetry, production systems or spectrum authorizations.

It produces the two things auditors and regulators increasingly ask for and most operators cannot supply: an asset inventory that includes unmanaged devices, and a time-stamped record of the wireless environment.

Several frameworks already require rogue-wireless scanning that is performed manually and periodically today. Continuous monitoring replaces that exercise with exportable, audit-ready evidence.

Yes. The platform integrates with SIEM, SOAR, ITSM and ITSL, CMDB, firewall, and NAC platforms through API-based connectors, so wireless events flow into the same ticketing and response workflow your analysts already use.

It also maintains historical RF event logs for forensic review — time-synced records that support incident investigation, compliance reporting, insurance claims, and litigation. In practice the forensic record is often what justifies the program internally, because it converts "we think something happened" into a defensible timeline.

No. The sensors require no software on endpoints, no network tap, and no on-premise server. Sensors observe the RF environment directly and report to a cloud portal. Where connecting sensors to the production network is undesirable, they can backhaul over LTE instead.

This is why deployments move quickly — there is no agent rollout, no change window on production infrastructure, and no dependency on the network you are trying to assess.

Gaming and hospitality properties combine the hardest conditions in wireless security: enormous floor area across dozens of zones, extremely high device turnover from transient guests, third-party wireless installations outside direct IT control, and guest-privacy exposure in rooms, restrooms, and convention space.

In deployed gaming and hospitality environments, LOCH sensors have identified fake access points and rogue cell towers impersonating authorized networks, weak third-party wireless installations that were trivially attackable, and a connected camera transmitting from a restroom. Sensors have been deployed across multiple properties with data feeding into network detection and response tooling, and have defended a property hosting one of the largest hacker conventions in the world.

The operational value is continuity: monitoring for policy violations, long-running new devices and networks, and changes in DAS and tower deployments, rather than a point-in-time sweep that is stale the day after it finishes.

Continuous wireless monitoring produces the two things auditors and underwriters increasingly ask for and most organizations cannot supply: a complete asset inventory that includes unmanaged devices, and a time-stamped forensic record of the wireless environment.

Asset inventory is a control requirement in essentially every major framework, and an inventory that excludes everything not on the network is an incomplete one. On the insurance side, carriers are tightening requirements around demonstrated visibility, and RF event logs give you evidence rather than assertion when a claim is reviewed.

Most commercial engagements run in three stages: a scoped site assessment that baselines what is emitting today, a sensor design that sets count and placement against that baseline, and installation with SIEM integration and analyst handover.

Sensor count is driven by coverage geometry, not just square footage — building materials, floor separation, and where the sensitive space actually sits all move the number. This is why we assess before quoting rather than pricing off a floor plan.

Layered detection means running complementary sensing modalities — RF, acoustic, radar, and electro-optical — so that a threat defeating one modality is still caught by another. No single modality covers the full threat set, because each one is blind to a specific and well-understood class of aircraft.

• RF detects the control link and often geolocates the operator, but not an aircraft flying a pre-loaded waypoint mission with its radio off.
• Radar sees physical returns, but small drones flying low against clutter sit at the edge of its performance envelope.
• Acoustic detects the one signature a flying object cannot suppress, but at shorter range.
• EO/IR confirms and identifies visually, but needs a cue and clear line of sight.

Adversaries adapt to whatever you field. Layering is what keeps a single countermeasure from collapsing your entire detection picture.

Remote ID is the FAA rule, codified at 14 CFR Part 89, requiring most drones to broadcast identification and location while operating outdoors. It is often described as a digital license plate: any compatible receiver nearby can read the drone's serial number, its position and altitude, and the position of its control station.

Enforcement has been in effect since March 16, 2024, with no grace period, and civil penalties reach $27,500 per violation. Compliance comes either built into the aircraft — most DJI models released since 2022 — or through an add-on broadcast module.

One detail that matters operationally: the broadcast itself does not identify the owner. Only authorized agencies can connect a broadcast serial number to the registration record behind it.

For airspace awareness, it is often sufficient. For security, it is not. Remote ID is a cooperative system — it reports drones whose operators chose to comply. Nearly every category of aircraft a security program exists to catch is either exempt from the rule or non-compliant by design.

The closest analogy is ADS-B in manned aviation. ADS-B gives controllers an excellent picture of cooperative traffic, and no serious airspace security program treats it as a substitute for primary radar. Remote ID occupies the same position for drones.

What Remote ID does not show you:

• Drones with Remote ID disabled, spoofed, or never installed. An operator smuggling contraband into a correctional facility has strong incentive to be invisible and no incentive to broadcast.
• Aircraft under 250g flown recreationally — the DJI Mini class — which are unregistered and exempt.
• Operations at FAA-Recognized Identification Areas (FRIAs), which are exempt by design.
• DIY, home-built, and modified airframes, which carry no compliant module.
• Anything indoors, since the rule covers outdoor operation only.
• Foreign and adversary systems, which are not subject to FAA rulemaking at all.

Receiver range is also environment-dependent in a way spec sheets rarely convey. Broadcast Remote ID is a short-range signal, and a handheld receiver in dense urban terrain covers a fraction of what a mast-mounted sensor covers in open ground. SkyShield LR detects control links out to 14 km, frequently before an aircraft leaves the ground.

The right answer is to use both. Remote ID is a genuinely valuable layer, and the strongest architecture ingests it: compliant traffic gets whitelisted and stops generating alerts, so operators spend their attention on the non-cooperative contacts that RF, acoustic, and radar sensing surface. Remote ID tells you about the drones following the rules. SkyShield tells you about the ones that aren't.

The DoD classifies unmanned aircraft into five groups by weight, operating altitude, and speed. Group 1 covers aircraft under 20 lbs operating below 1,200 feet AGL at under roughly 100 knots. Group 2 covers 21 to 55 lbs, below 3,500 feet AGL, at up to roughly 250 knots.

Detection approach differs between them. Group 1 detection typically relies on RF spectrum monitoring, acoustic sensing, electro-optical, or Wi-Fi and cellular signature identification. Group 2 generally requires RF direction finding, multi-sensor fusion combining RF with radar and EO/IR, and data-link fingerprinting.

Group 1 is where the majority of the installation-defense and critical-infrastructure problem sits today — commercial quadcopters used for surveillance, payload delivery, and perimeter probing.

SkyShield is an RF-based counter-UAS detection system that detects, tracks, classifies, and geolocates unauthorized drones and their operators. It uses AI-enabled signal classification against a library of more than 500 known threat models, covering commercial, hobbyist, and DIY-built aircraft.

The fixed and mountable SkyShield LR configuration supports detection from 7 to 14 km depending on configuration and environment, across 2.4 GHz, 5.2 GHz, 5.8 GHz, 915 MHz, 868 MHz, and 433 MHz, with RF direction finding, 360-degree airspace coverage, and near-zero false alarms. It emits nothing. Situational awareness is delivered to both desktop and mobile applications.

It can be permanently mounted to infrastructure, vehicles, or aircraft, or deployed rapidly from a transport case.

SkyShield LR detects RF control links from 7 to 14 km — roughly 4.5 to 8.7 miles — depending on configuration and environment. SkyShield Mobile reaches 3 to 7 km. SkyShield Sentry detects acoustically to 2,000 m. In practice, detection frequently happens before takeoff, because the control link is active during power-up and pre-flight while the aircraft is still on the ground.

Treat any published range as a ceiling rather than a guarantee. Real sites add clutter, RF congestion, terrain, and obstructions that spec-sheet figures measured in open ground do not account for. Low-flying aircraft are harder to detect at distance than high ones, and hills, tree lines, and buildings create genuine blind spots.

Which is the argument for layering. Range is one modality's strength; another modality's strength is seeing what the first one structurally cannot.

They solve three different problems. LR is the fixed long-range dome for persistent site coverage. Mobile is a ruggedized handheld and backpack-portable kit for tactical and expeditionary use, covering 3 to 7 km. Sentry is the acoustic system that detects aircraft RF cannot see.

• SkyShield LR — 7 to 14 km, fixed or vehicle-mounted, MIL-STD RF hardware, 360-degree coverage, roughly 25 lbs with case.
• SkyShield Mobile — 3 to 7 km, handheld with direction-finding antennas, MOLLE-compatible, roughly 4.5 hours of battery on DF antennas or up to 6 on omnidirectional, ATAK-compatible.
• SkyShield Sentry — acoustic detection to 2,000 m, non-RF-emitting, with AI-enabled targeting and autonomous interceptor management through a centralized C2 console.

Most installation-defense architectures use LR for the persistent picture and Mobile for patrol, response, and forward elements, with Sentry added where the threat set includes non-emitting aircraft.

Yes. RF direction finding on the control link lets SkyShield geolocate the remote controller as well as the aircraft, and identify aircraft by unique device ID.

Operationally this is often the more valuable output. An aircraft overhead is a symptom; the operator is the actionable target — the person a response team can lawfully contact, and the element that turns a detection into an investigation rather than an observation.

Because detection triggers on the control link rather than the airframe, the system frequently sees aircraft during power-up and pre-flight — before takeoff, and at standoff distances well outside a perimeter.

Yes. SkyShield Mobile pushes live contacts into ATAK, and the platform exposes simple APIs for integration with digital battle management systems. It is compatible with tactical MANET radios. SkyShield Sentry is network-ready for integration with external C2 systems.

Integration is usually the deciding factor in operational adoption. A sensor that requires an operator to watch a dedicated screen adds a task; a sensor that pushes contacts into the common operating picture the unit is already running adds capability without adding manning.

Yes — that is what SkyShield Sentry exists for. Fiber-optic tethered drones and pre-programmed autonomous aircraft are specifically designed to defeat RF and GPS-based counter-UAS: no control link to intercept, no GPS dependency, low-altitude flight below radar coverage, and minimal electronic signature.

Sentry detects them acoustically. Any aircraft that flies must move air, and moving air makes sound. Sentry uses acoustic sensing with AI classification, optimized for the low-RPM, low-signature flight profiles tethered platforms produce, with sensor fusion across modalities, direction finding and range estimation, high clutter rejection, and full operation in GPS-denied and RF-congested environments.

The design premise is simple: tethered drones defeat electronic detection, but they cannot defeat physics.

Parts of the portfolio are, and parts are not — and the distinction is doctrinal rather than promotional. In electromagnetic spectrum operations, electronic warfare divides into electronic support, electronic protection, and electronic attack. SkyShield and AirShield perform electronic support and contribute directly to electronic protection. SkyWall is an electronic attack capability, and is fielded only to operators with the authority to employ one.

AirShield and NetShield AI additionally provide active mitigation at the network layer — terminating unauthorized connections and enforcing policy against identified threats — which is a security enforcement action rather than an electronic attack.

We are precise about this for an operational reason. A requirements owner who hears "electronic warfare" applied to a receive-only sensor will discount the claim, and one who hears it applied to a network enforcement action will assume a spectrum-interference problem that does not exist. Describing each capability by what it actually does — support, protection, network enforcement, or attack — is what keeps a program moving through the right approval chain.

SAFE Perimeter fields aerial mitigation capability for customers with the legal authority to operate it. (Wireless-layer mitigation is a separate matter and is available far more broadly — see the commercial panel.) SkyWall is an RF counter-UAS mitigation system providing 360-degree protection to a radius of 2 to 3 km, with automated, manual wideband, and smart selective modes when integrated with SkyShield detection and direction finding. SkyShield Sentry provides non-RF kinetic interception.

These systems are sold only where RF mitigation is permitted or required, and only with the applicable regulatory licenses and authorizations in place. SkyWall procurement requires a completed end-user certificate.

In the United States, counter-UAS mitigation authority is granted by statute to a limited set of federal entities. The Department of War — still the Department of Defense as a matter of statute — and the Department of Energy operate under 10 U.S.C. § 130i; the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice operate under 6 U.S.C. § 124n. State and local law enforcement, and private operators, do not currently hold independent mitigation authority.

Detection carries no equivalent restriction, which is why detection-first architecture is the practical starting point for nearly every program. It also positions an organization to act quickly if authority expands, because the sensing layer is already in place and the mitigation layer integrates on top of it.

SkyShield is built for rapid deployment. The dome configuration deploys and reaches operational status in field conditions in well under an hour, and the Mobile kit requires no installation at all — it operates from a vehicle, backpack, or tactical hardcase.

This supports temporary and expeditionary use cases directly: exercise support, emergency response, forward operating positions, mobile command posts, convoy and vehicle escort, and temporary event security.

Yes. The FEMA Counter-UAS Grant Program, established under the One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025, provides $500 million across two fiscal years. FY2026 prioritized $250 million for the eleven states hosting FIFA World Cup 2026 matches; the remaining $250 million opens in FY2027 to all 56 states and territories.

Eligible purchases include RF detection systems, radar, optical sensors, and tracking software. Mitigation equipment is additionally eligible for law enforcement agencies whose personnel are trained or enrolled at the FBI's National Counter-UAS Training Center — which is the practical route by which a state or local agency reaches mitigation capability.

For military and federal buyers, the JIATF-401 Counter-UAS Marketplace offers a streamlined procurement channel that sits on an existing IDIQ contract, letting authorized buyers acquire validated counter-UAS systems without working through separate acquisition pathways.

SAFE Perimeter supports grant scoping and application language, including the technical justification and system architecture sections that grant reviewers actually score.

Yes. The SkyShield product line — including SkyShield LR, SkyShield Mobile, SkyShield Sentry, and SkyWall — is available on GSA Schedule through our distribution partners, with first-year hardware and software support warranty included on the core systems.

Department of War, federal civilian, and state and local buyers can all acquire through this path. SAFE Perimeter supports acquisition from requirements definition through award, including sensor architecture, integration planning, and sustainment.

Because the same spectrum carries both problems. The aerial threat and the ground-level RF threat are visible to the same class of sensor, and installations that instrument only for drones leave the larger surface unmonitored.

Government environments have consistent gaps: limited in-house wireless and IoT expertise, air-gap assumptions that have never been validated against actual RF, SCIF and no-wireless zones enforced by policy rather than measurement, and a steady migration of control systems toward wireless and cloud connectivity. AirShield addresses these by proving whether an air gap is actually effective and whether a no-wireless zone is actually clean.

Technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) is the practice of detecting and neutralizing covert surveillance devices — hidden cameras, audio transmitters, GPS trackers, and unauthorized recording equipment — in a protected space. It is commonly referred to as a bug sweep or a debugging sweep.

Traditional TSCM is an event: a team arrives, sweeps, and leaves. The structural weakness is obvious in retrospect — a sweep certifies a room for the moment it ended. A device installed an hour later, or one that only transmits during the meeting it was placed for, will not appear in any sweep report.

A traditional sweep is a moment in time: scheduled, expensive, dependent on the specialist in the room, often limited to Wi-Fi and Bluetooth, and leaving little forensic record if something is found. The room is clean when they leave — and can be re-compromised minutes later. It also does not travel with the principal.

A standing watch is a posture rather than a visit: continuous and passive across 300 MHz to 6 GHz, surfacing threats in minutes with the device located for retrieval, and producing a time-stamped RF log that can be replayed after the fact. Modern practice pairs the two — periodic sweeps for physical inspection, continuous monitoring for everything between them.

A current-generation TSCM capability has to cover the full range a covert device might use to exfiltrate — not just the Wi-Fi band. That means Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and BLE, cellular across 2G through 5G and LTE, LPWAN, GPS, and the sub-GHz bands used by cheap purpose-built transmitters and drone control links.

The SAFE Perimeter approach combines three elements:

• Broad-spectrum sensing across 300 MHz to 6 GHz, so a device is not missed because it uses an unexpected protocol.
• Classification — identifying vendor, protocol, and device type rather than just registering that something is transmitting.
• Direction finding and localization, so the team can physically recover the device rather than confirm one exists.

Handheld detectors give a proximity reading. Classification and localization are what turn a sweep into a recovery.

Most modern crimes involve a device — a phone, a drone, a wireless emitter. RF device fingerprinting identifies a specific device from the characteristics of its transmissions, with no access to the device itself and no cooperation from the network it uses. Digital suspect identification applies that capability investigatively: turning digital traces at a scene into leads.

What it produces is a persistent identifier for a device present at a location and time. That supports placing a device at a scene, establishing recurring presence, associating devices with one another, and building a pattern-of-life picture from RF alone — narrowing a suspect pool and linking individuals to network hardware.

With the proper legal authority, the platform can produce a digital fingerprint of an area, showing the devices, movements, and individuals present during an incident, and supporting a holistic reconstruction of events. The platform fingerprints across thousands of device types, including unauthorized hotspots, IoT devices, and drone control links.

The platform produces time-synchronized forensic RF logs designed to support investigation, evidence building, and prosecution, with historical replay of the wireless environment. Whether a specific record is admissible in a specific proceeding is a question for the prosecuting authority and depends on jurisdiction, collection authority, and chain of custody.

What the technology provides is a defensible record: what was transmitting, when, on what protocol, and where — retained and replayable rather than reconstructed from memory.

The LOCH Detector is an IMSI catcher and locator built for special military and law enforcement operations. It detects and logs the IMSI numbers of nearby mobile devices, supports movement tracking and traffic analysis, and can locate GSM devices even in areas with no network coverage or difficult terrain.

It is available in man-portable, covert, vehicle, and UAV payload configurations. All units are built to MIL-STD-461F and MIL-STD-810G, IP67-rated, dual-channel minimum, Five Eyes compliant, and swarm-capable for coordinated multi-unit operations. Data is stored locally on the controlling workstation, encrypted with TLS/SSL and AES-256 over secure WebSockets, with no data retained on the detectors themselves.

Availability is restricted to qualified government and law enforcement end users with appropriate legal authority.

Search and rescue teams use IMSI location to find missing individuals in disaster zones and remote areas where cellular coverage has failed. The system can create a private network, scan for devices in areas of no coverage, locate a device from authentication readings, and provide mapping data directly to rescue teams.

Teams can also place a voice call or send SMS to a located device, which converts a position estimate into confirmed contact with a survivor.

On the wireless layer, agencies can mitigate. AirShield and NetShield AI terminate unauthorized connections, isolate devices, and enforce access control policy against identified threats in facilities the agency controls — jails, evidence areas, task force spaces, dispatch centers, and protected venues. On the aerial layer, mitigation authority is federal and statutory; most state and local agencies do not hold it.

The practical consequence for a sheriff or a chief is that a counter-UAS program is a detection, geolocation, and interdiction-at-the-operator program, while a wireless program can be a full detect-and-respond program today.

Where aerial mitigation is required, the usual path is a federal partnership rather than an independent capability.

Jamming is indiscriminate. It blocks all communication in its footprint, offers little control over what it affects, and commonly spills into adjacent areas and disrupts civilian networks — including the networks the responding agency itself depends on.

Detection-led approaches build an intelligence picture instead: identify the devices present, estimate their locations, and whitelist friendly numbers so that any subsequent action is precise rather than blanket. Operationally that means an agency keeps its own communications intact and can distinguish targets from bystanders.

Contraband drops are an RF problem before they are an airspace problem. Detection catches the drone's control link during power-up and pre-flight — often while the aircraft is still miles outside the fence — classifies it against the 500-plus model library, and geolocates the operator so staff can direct a response to the launch point rather than the drop point.

Intercepting at the operator is the higher-value outcome. A recovered package removes one delivery; a located operator interrupts the supply route.

Corrections is one of the environments SkyShield is specifically built for, alongside law enforcement, airports, seaports, stadiums, and government facilities.

Physical security is largely a solved problem for a protective detail. A detail controls the doors, the routes, and the room — but it cannot control the airwaves, and that is where modern surveillance against principals now lives. A camera the size of a shirt button. A tracker magnet-mounted under a bumper. A cell interceptor in the suite next door.

Coverage extends to the environments a principal actually moves through:

• Residence — estates, guest houses, staff quarters, and grounds
• Vehicle — motorcades, daily drivers, and hired cars
• Aircraft and yacht — cabins, hangars, marinas, and crew spaces
• Hotel and travel — suites, adjoining rooms, and event floors
• Office and boardroom — executive floors, deal rooms, and family offices

What it finds: hidden cameras concealed in rooms, fixtures, vehicles and gifts; listening devices on or off the network; cell interceptors positioned to capture calls and device identity; GPS trackers on vehicles, luggage, and personal effects; impersonated Wi-Fi and evil-twin traps; and camera drones over property lines, helipads, marinas, and arrivals.

The deployment model is one sensor at home and one in the bag. A discreet enclosure covers a residence, office, or cabin; an executive backpack carries the same capability through hotels, airports, and unfamiliar rooms — nothing on show, nothing to explain.

Discretion is itself a security control here. AirShield is entirely passive: it transmits nothing, interferes with nothing, and gives away no signature of its own, so the people watching your principal never learn that someone is watching back.

Yes. SkyShield Mobile is designed for exactly this — deployed from a vehicle, backpack, or tactical hardcase with no installation required, supporting emergency response, remote fieldwork, and mobile command posts. Sensors can backhaul over LTE where no network is available.

For fixed venues that host periodic events, a hybrid architecture is usually better economics: permanent sensors covering the core footprint, with mobile kits extending coverage to overflow areas, parking, and perimeter approaches on event days. Temporary installations also suit rooftop monitoring, high-profile gatherings, and National Special Security Events.

Less than most agencies expect. SkyShield delivers situational awareness through desktop and mobile applications built for operational users rather than RF engineers, and SkyShield Sentry operates fully autonomously with no skilled operator required.

SAFE Perimeter provides comprehensive operator training as part of deployment, scoped to the configuration fielded and the roles that will use it. Partners additionally offer risk assessments, 24/7 NOC and managed services, operational support, and advanced training for agencies that want the capability without standing up an internal function.